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PREVIEW; Daniels v. Gallatin County: Increased Liability as a
Result of Excess Insurance
Sam Doxzon*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Daniels v.
Gallatin County on Thursday, March 3, 2022 at 9:30 a.m. via Zoom.1 John
Harkins and James Zadick are expected to appear on behalf of appellants
Atlantis Specialty Insurance Company and Gallatin County. Martha
Sheehy and Jonathan Cok are expected to appear on behalf of appellee
Don Daniels.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main issue in this case is whether Gallatin County’s insurance
policy exposed its insurer, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (ASIC),
to liability beyond statutorily capped government liability limits.
Determination of this issue is largely a tale of two statutes:
Montana Code Annotated § 2-9-108
(1) The state, a county, municipality, taxing district, or any
other political subdivision of the state is not liable in tort action
for damages suffered as a result of an act or omission of an
officer, agent, or employee of that entity in excess of $750,000
for each claim and $1.5 million for each occurrence.
[. . .]
(3) An insurer is not liable for excess damages unless the
insurer specifically agrees by written endorsement to provide
coverage to the governmental agency involved in amounts in
excess of a limitation stated in this section, in which case the
insurer may not claim the benefits of the limitation specifically
waived.2
Montana Code Annotated § 33-15-302
The policy, when issued, shall contain the entire contract
between the parties, and neither the insurer or any insurance
producer or representative thereof nor any person insured
thereunder shall make any agreement as to the insurance which
is not plainly expressed in the policy.3

*

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana, Class of 2022.
1
The argument will be live-streamed on the Court’s website at:
http://stream.vision.net/MT-JUD/.
2
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-108.
3
Id. § 33-15-302.
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Based on these statutes, two key questions present themselves:
1) Does § 33-15-302 preclude ASIC from relying on the liability
limitations in § 2-9-108(1) because ASIC’s policy with Gallatin
County never invokes § 2-9-108(1), its language, or its $750,000
liability limit?
2) Does ASIC’s inclusion of excess coverage in Gallatin County’s
policy constitute a “specific agreement by written endorsement”
such that ASIC waived the statutory cap in accordance with § 29-108(3)?
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2017, a Gallatin County snowplow operator ran a stop
sign and collided with Sarah Daniels’s vehicle.4 Daniels was severely
injured in the collision and now suffers from life-long debilitating
injuries.5 Don Daniels, as conservator of Sarah’s estate, subsequently sued
Gallatin County for negligence and sought damages in excess of the
$750,000 statutory cap.6 Gallatin County has conceded that it is liable for
the actions of its employee and that Daniels’s damages exceed the
$750,000 statutory cap.7
At the time of the collision, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company
(“ASIC”) insured Gallatin County under Policy Number 791000853-0001
(the “Policy”).8 According to the Policy, Gallatin County was insured for
up to $1,500,000 for automobile accidents.9 Additionally, the Policy
provided “Excess Liability Coverage” up to $5,000,000 on top of the
automobile liability coverage.10 At no point does the Policy limit liability
to $750,000 per claim, nor does it ever reference § 2-9-108 or any other
statutory liability cap.11
To clarify whether the statutory cap limited ASIC’s liability in this
incident, Daniels filed a motion for partial summary judgment with the
Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court to declare that § 2-9-108(1)
did not apply.12 Upon review, the district court granted Daniels’s motion

4

Appellant’s Opening Brief, Tab 5 at 1–2, Daniels v. Gallatin Cty., No. DA-210321 (Mont. Oct. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/2GGH-X3L7.
5
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 5 at 3–10.
6
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 5 at 11–14.
7
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 5 at 2.
8
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 2 at 2.
9
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 2 at 2.
10
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 2 at 2–3.
11
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 2 at 2.
12
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 2 at 1.
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and ruled that § 2-9-108(1)’s liability cap did not apply.13 The district court
held that: (1) ASIC could not rely on § 2-9-108(1)’s cap because the policy
did not reference it; and (2) ASIC’s inclusion of “Excess Liability
Coverage” up to $5,000,000 in the Policy constituted a waiver of the
$750,000 cap in accordance with § 2-9-108(3).14 Following a three-day
bench trial, the district court subsequently entered judgment against
Gallatin County, finding that Daniels is entitled to $12,410,016.11.15 ASIC
appealed.16
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A. Appellee’s Arguments
Daniels offers a two-pronged argument: (1) that § 33-15-302 prevents
ASIC from relying on § 2-9-108(1) to limit its liability; and (2) that under
§ 2-9-108(3), ASIC’s voluntary inclusion of optional excess coverage in
the Policy constitutes a waiver of the § 2-9-108(1) liability cap.
Additionally, Daniels emphasizes that either argument is dispositive.17
The crux of Daniels’s first argument is that Montana’s Insurance Code
forbids ASIC from relying on § 2-9-108(1)’s liability cap because the
Policy references no aspect of the statute. § 33-15-302 and other parts of
Montana’s Insurance Code require insurance policies to contain the
entirety of the contract between insured and insurer to ensure proper notice
for involved parties.18 Montana courts have also held that insurance
policies must be enforced as written—provided their terms are clear.19
Montana courts, therefore, cannot impute outside language.20
Consequently, Daniels argues that the Policy cannot be interpreted to
include § 2-9-108(1)’s liability limits because the language of the Policy
clearly extends coverage up to $6.5 million and never references the
statute or the $750,000 cap.21
The second prong of Daniels’s argument asserts that even if ASIC can
invoke § 2-9-108, the liability cap is moot because ASIC waived it by
providing Gallatin County with excess coverage.22 According to Daniels,
the plain language of § 2-9-108(3) establishes the “cause-effect” that when
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 2 at 10–11.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 2 at 11.
15
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, Tab 7 at 2.
16
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
17
Appellee’s Reply Brief at 37, Daniels v. Gallatin Cty., No. DA-21-0321,
(Mont. Oct. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/WF9U-KVNE.
18
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-15-302, 33-15-303, 33-15-337.
19
Steadele v. Colony Ins. Co., 260 P.3d 145, 149 (Mont. 2011); Grimsrud v.
Hagel, 119 P.3d 47, 150 (Mont. 2005).
20
Id.
21
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 21–23.
22
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 37.
13
14

2022

PREVIEW: DANIELS V. GALLATIN COUNTY

16

an insurer provides a government agency with excess insurance, they
waive the protections of § 2-9-108(1).23 Daniels does not view § 2-9108(3) as requiring a “specific waiver” of the liability cap.24
Instead, Daniels bases their argument on the interpretation that ASIC’s
inclusion of optional excess coverage constitutes ASIC’s specific
agreement by written endorsement.25 Daniels relies on a definition of
“endorsement” from ASIC’s Brief, defining an endorsement as a “written
modification of the coverage of an insurance policy.”26 Using this
definition, Daniels reasons that the addition of the optional excess
insurance to Gallatin County’s policy constitutes an “endorsement;” and,
consequently, that ASIC satisfied § 2-9-108(3)’s waiver requirements.27
B. Appellant’s Arguments
Following a similar two-prong approach, ASIC begins its argument
that it can rely on § 2-9-108(1) to limit its liability by observing that under
the plain language of the Policy they are only liable for what the county
“legally must pay as damages.”28 ASIC concedes that its policy never
references § 2-9-108(1),29 and ASIC also never mentions § 33-15-302 or
the Insurance Code in the entirety of its argument.
However, ASIC emphatically argues that the definitional meaning of
indemnification means that insurers cannot be held liable for damages that
the insured is not obligated to pay.30 ASIC reasons that because § 2-9108(1) specifically limits the amount the County must pay to $750,000,
then ASIC’s duty to indemnify the County cannot be construed to provide
funds beyond that cap.31 ASIC invokes Winter v. State Farm Mutual
Automotive Insurance Co.,32 to explain that insurers are not liable to the
injured party directly; rather, the insured is liable to the injured party, and
the insurer simply relieves the insured of the incurred liability.33
Essentially, because the Policy’s indemnification clause limits ASIC’s
liability to Gallatin County’s liability, ASIC’s liability is limited by § 2-9108(1) regardless of its exclusion from the Policy.
Moving to the second prong, ASIC also takes issue with the district
court’s finding that ASIC waived the statutory liability cap in accordance
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 38.
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 47.
25
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 42.
26
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 42.
27
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 43–44.
28
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12.
29
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 19.
30
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 14–16.
31
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–16.
32
328 P.3d 665, 670 (Mont. 2014).
33
Id. at 17.
23
24
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with § 2-9-108(3).34 ASIC argues that, as the insurer of a government
agency, it automatically benefits from § 2-9-108(1)’s liability cap, and that
§ 2-9-108(3) serves as an “opt-out provision” that requires a “specific
agreement by written endorsement” to trigger.35 Accordingly, ASIC
argues that neither the Policy’s omission of any reference to § 2-9-108 nor
its inclusion of excess coverage beyond the cap, qualify as a “specific
agreement by written endorsement.”36 Indeed, ASIC asserts that because
the Policy fails to mention § 2-9-108, the Policy cannot be interpreted to
specifically waive the statute’s protections.37
Further, ASIC disputes on multiple fronts the district court’s finding
that ASIC waived § 2-9-108(1)’s protections by insuring Gallatin County
above $750,000. First, ASIC observes that the language of § 2-9-108(3)
necessitates that it refers only to insurers who have provided excess
coverage; otherwise, there would be no question that the insurer is not
liable for damages above $750,000 because policy itself of cap the
liability.38 Second, ASIC contends that policy limits delineated in an
insurance policy do not constitute a “written endorsement.”39 And lastly,
ASIC points to the enforcement of similar statutes in other states as
evidence that Montana’s statute cannot be interpreted such that excess
coverage provisions waive the statutory caps because the statute does not
explicitly state this, as Idaho’s does.40
IV. ANALYSIS
When reviewing both parties’ briefs together, there are two main
takeaways: (1) the briefs largely talk past each other, and (2) neither party
includes convincing legal support for their key arguments. Both arguments
are predominantly comprised of either definitional logic or only vaguely
supported legal assertions. That said, it is critical to note that both issues
are dispositive for ASIC: should the Court agree with Daniels on either
point, ASIC will be held liable for the $12 million judgment. Given this
burden, it seems unlikely that ASIC succeeds on appeal despite both its
arguments being slightly more robust.
A. The Court will likely find that § 2-9-108 is applicable in determining
ASIC’s liability.
The dispute over whether ASIC can rely on § 2-9-108 to limit its
liability, despite never incorporating the statute’s language into the Policy,
34

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18.
36
Id. at 18.
37
Id. at 20–21.
38
Id. at 23–24.
39
Id. at 24.
40
Id. at 31–35.
35
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depends primarily on how the Policy’s indemnification clause is
interpreted. As a contract, the language of an insurance policy must govern
its interpretation if the language is clear and explicit.41 An ambiguity exists
only if, when taken as a whole, the policy has more than one reasonable
interpretation.42 An ambiguous provision must be construed against the
insurer.43 A mere disagreement over the meaning of a provision, however,
does not constitute an ambiguity.44
Here, the ASIC’s policy with Gallatin County does not contain any
ambiguities; the dispute about § 2-9-108’s applicability is merely a
disagreement over the meaning of the Policy’s indemnification clause. As
§ 33-15-302 requires, an insurance policy must include the entirety of the
contract. In the case of the Policy, its indemnification clause states:
“[ASIC] will pay all sums [Gallatin County] legally must pay as damages
because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the ownership,
maintenance or use of a covered auto.”45 This provision clearly outlines
the degree to which ASIC is obligated to indemnify Gallatin County.
Daniels’s agreement that “ASIC is legally obligated to pay the judgment
entered against the County” evidences the clarity of this provision.46 Thus,
there is no ambiguity about the extent of ASIC’s indemnification that the
Court could interpret in favor of Daniels.
Instead, the Court must resolve the disagreement between Daniels and
ASIC about what amount the County is obligated to pay. This is how ASIC
incorporates § 2-9-108’s cap into its policy. In accordance with § 33-15302 and based on the plain meaning of the Policy’s language, the Policy’s
indemnification clause only allows ASIC to be liable for the amount that
Gallatin County legally must pay: an amount that § 2-9-108(1) caps at
$750,000. ASIC argues, with considerable legal support, that the district
court’s judgment against Gallatin County is improper because it exceeds
the clearly defined statutory limit.47 And if the judgment entered against
the County is conformed to § 2-9-108(1)’s cap, then Daniels’s own
reasoning would conclude that ASIC is only liable for $750,000.

41

Heggem v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 154 P.3d 1189, 1193 (Mont. 2007) (citing
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-401).
42
Id. at 1193.
43
Leibrand v. Natl. Farmers Union Prop. and Cas. Co., 898 P.2d 1220, 1223
(Mont. 1995).
44
Heggem, 154 P.3d at 1195.
45
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 22 (internal quotations omitted).
46
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 24.
47
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 34–39. (citing Zauflik v.
Pennsbury School District, 104 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2014); Siebert v. Okun, 485 P.3d
1265 (N.M. 2021)).
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Even if the $12 million judgment is deemed proper, Daniels misses the
distinction between the sum of final judgment and the sum of the remedy
available against the government. In Mackin v. State, a case that Daniels
cites, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted a predecessor statute to § 29-108 to determine the implications of its liability cap.48 The Court held
that the effect of the statute was to “limit the remedy available against the
state or governmental entity after its liability has been determined by final
judgment.”49 A claimant like Daniels can therefore receive a full judgment
against the government, but the amount actually paid out is limited to the
statutory cap.
B. The Court will likely find that ASIC has not waived § 2-9-108(1)’s
liability cap.
As for whether ASIC waived the statutory cap, the plain language of
§ 2-9-108(3) states that an insurer waives the protections of § 2-9-108(1)
only if the insurer “specifically agrees by written endorsement to provide
coverage [. . .] in excess of [the cap], in which case the insurer may not
claim the benefits on the limitation specifically waived.”50 Given this
language, ASIC views § 2-9-108(3) as requiring a “specific waiver;” a
provision that cannot exist in the Policy because the Policy never
references § 2-9-108.51 Daniels counterargues that the plain language of
the statute does not actually require a specific waiver, and steers the Court
towards the generic legal standard for waiver of rights.52 Neither party
offers any legal support for their stances on this stage of interpretation.
And without any legal precedent on the specific language of § 2-9-108(3),
it is difficult to assess which interpretation is proper.
On the one hand, ASIC did exactly what the statute describes as
resulting in a waiver: providing coverage in excess of the cap. On the other
hand, if § 2-9-108(3) effectuated a waiver whenever an insurer provided
excess coverage, there would be no need for § 2-9-108(3)’s qualifying
language; a policy limit would either exceed $750,000, thereby waiving
the cap, or undercut $750,000, thereby creating its own ceiling on the
insurer’s liability. Given the interpretive imperative not to render statutory
language pointless,53 ASIC’s position appears sound enough to be
decisive.

48

Mackin v. State, 621 P.2d 477 (Mont. 1980) (interpreting MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 2-9-104 which contained nearly identical statutory cap language).
49
Mackin, 621 P.2d at 483.
50
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-108(3) (emphasis added).
51
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 22.
52
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 47.
53
Groves v. Clark, 920 P.2d 981, 984 (Mont. 1996) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §
1-2-101).
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Beyond this interpretive issue, the remainder of both parties’
arguments are essentially a wash. The strongest aspect of Daniels’s
argument is their effective characterization of the Policy as a written
endorsement; they do not, however, convincingly establish that it qualifies
as a “specific agreement.”54 Instead, Daniels replaces this requirement
with a different waiver standard requiring only proof that ASIC knew of
its right, acted inconsistent with it, and thereby prejudiced Daniels.55 There
is no clear and legally supported explanation of why this different standard
should be used in place of § 2-9-108(3)’s language.
Additionally, Daniels routinely cites Mackin throughout their
argument to contend that the purpose of § 2-9-108(3) is to allow “a
governmental entity to provide a method of recovery in amounts in excess
of the caps.”56 But as discussed previously, that was not the conclusion of
the Court.57 Daniels also misappropriates language from § 2-9-111(5), a
statute relating solely to the liability of legislative members, to argue that
§ 2-9-108(1) should not apply to Gallatin County because government
immunity does not apply to auto liability.58
Meanwhile, ASIC’s venture into incorporating case law from other
states is also unconvincing. ASIC relies heavily on Zauflik v. Pennsbury
School Dist.,59 but the Pennsylvania statute at issue in that case is
considerably different than § 2-9-108.60 Consequently, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s holding that an insured’s purchase of excess insurance
does not waive their statutory liability cap is only somewhat applicable.61
Further, ASIC’s reference to Kansas’s and Idaho’s statutory equivalents
to § 2-9-108 nearly undermines their own argument because both statutes
use language very similar to § 2-9-108(3) to explicitly state the issuance
of excess insurance constitutes a waiver of their statutory liability cap.62
V. CONCLUSION
In Daniels v. Gallatin County, the Court has the opportunity to clarify
the implications of both § 33-15-302 as it relates to indemnification
clauses and § 2-9-108(3) as it relates to its waiver requirement. And, while
neither parties’ arguments are overly convincing, ASIC’s arguments are
sounder on both issues and would result in less dramatic interpretive shifts.
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 44.
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 47 (citing Firestone v. Oasis
Telecomm., 38 P.3d 796 (Mont. 2001)).
56
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 46.
57
See supra Part IV(A).
58
Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 17, at 45.
59
104 A.3d 1096.
60
See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONSOL. STAT. ANN. §§ 8542, 8553.
61
Zauflik, 104 A.3d at 44.
62
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-926(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6111(a).
54
55
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Preventing ASIC from relying on the statutory cap because of § 33-15-302
would fundamentally contravene the implication of indemnification
clauses, while finding that ASIC waived the cap under § 2-9-108(3) would
render aspects of the statute’s language meaningless. It bears repeating that
both of these issues are dispositive for ASIC—a loss on either issue means
a loss overall. Ultimately, it is apparent that ASIC failed to perform due
diligence in the drafting or enforcement of its insurance policy with
Gallatin County; whether that failure warrants the loss of statutory
protections is now up to the Court to decide.

